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While data journalism has been the hot topic of various recent reports,
no studies have discussed how the changes in journalistic storytelling may
create new legal considerations for journalists. This report aims to help
journalists, lawyers, and academics understand the changes taking place in
media law as a result of both the growing volume of data in our informa-
tion economy, and the the seismic shifts occurring within journalism and
technology. By examining developments in newsgathering law, the Freedom
of Information Act, and laws involved in leak investigations, this research
underscores worrisome shifts in the law, as well as gray areas where reform
would strengthen the rights of a free press and journalists.
In its first part, the report looks at emerging concerns over data jour-
nalism projects that could trigger the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA), 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4)i for scraping, a data collection technique
that usually relies on automation—through bots, crawlers, or applications—
to extract data from a website. As data collection becomes increasingly
important for investigative journalists in particular, legal experts worry
about civil and criminal penalties that exist under the statute—which has
been described by some First Amendment advocates as unconstitutionally
vague. In reviewing the history and case law of the CFAA in relationship to
journalism, the research offers practical tips and various legal considerations
on the issue.
Next, the report discusses troubling trends arising under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) in the digital age, as the amount of government
information held in databases and government logs grows, and the need for
transparency is crucial. Lastly, it reviews data’s impact on laws affecting
i. This report uses legal notation for brevity’s sake, and to allow the reader to locate
and examine the laws for herself, should she so choose. In this case, the CFAA is located
in Title 18 of the US federal law, or “U.S.C.” for US Code, section 1030, paragraph a,
subparagraph 4.
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whistleblowers. In the past decade, we’ve seen more leak prosecutions in
the United States than all those combined in the country’s history. This, of
course, occurs at a time when there is more information than ever before
for whistleblowers to share.
Key findings
• While no journalists to date have been sued or prosecuted under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, there’s evidence that stories have been
hindered or held from publication for the threat of penalty. Under the
statute, a person may be penalized for “unauthorized access” to data
on a company’s website by scraping data through bots, crawlers, or
applications. While journalists have developed techniques and tools to
sidestep potential liability, including piecemeal data extraction that
goes unnoticed or crowdsourcing the public’s help, the CFAA presents
real obstacles to reporting a variety of important stories in the public
interest.
• In the past decade, as the volume of US government-controlled data has
increased, government agencies have experienced a swell in the num-
ber of FOIA requests. At the same time, reporters often see delays in
processing requests, insufficient searches conducted by the agencies, gov-
ernment data equated with proprietary information leading to denial
of access, and developing case law that prohibits access to government
databases. In a number of recent instances, courts have upheld determi-
nations by agencies that searching a government database amounts to
producing a new document—which is prohibited under FOIA.
• While no journalist has been convicted under the Espionage Act, the
statute includes provisions that could potentially be levied against jour-
nalists. Even more stifling than the policies and laws used to intimidate
and silence whistleblowers in the digital age, though, is the degree to
which government authorities seem preoccupied with journalists specifi-
cally. Now, possessing information obtained from confidential sources—a
basic tenet of First Amendment doctrine—is potentially a prosecutable
offense.
• In many ways, journalists’ access to critical information is being re-
stricted, either by the passive or explicit threat of criminal penalties,
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de-prioritization in favor of corporate secrecy, or an inadequate legal
understanding of technological advances.
While none of these shifts are totalizing—or irreversible—together they
indicate a new direction and acceleration in our information economy that
may have consequences for journalists. As more information is created,
there is growing need for reporters to discern the importance of volumi-
nous data dumps—and to uncover stories hidden in their details. Unlike
anti-secrecy sites such as WikiLeaks, journalists review, analyze, and edit
information to help citizens navigate the evolving information landscape.
But the current state of journalism, which often sees the press intimidated
by public officials and public figures, is presented with unique challenges in
an oversaturated information economy where there are fewer resources and
protections in place for journalists to discern the truth. It is time that we
consider these subtle shifts as a hazard to the Fourth Estate itself.
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
Introduction
In 1961, legal scholar Alexander Meiklejohn famously wrote that the ra-
tionale for the First Amendment depended on citizens’ ability to receive
and use information relevant to democratic self-governance.1 The crux of
his statement was this: knowledge is power. Fifteen years later, scholar
Thomas Emerson would rely on Meiklejohn’s work to famously highlight
the “vital importance in a democratic society of the right to know.”2 In his
article, he explained how James Madison, the author of the First Amend-
ment, asserted that “[a] popular government, without popular information
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or
perhaps both.”3 From there, Emerson continued, “A people who mean to be
their own governors, must arm themselves with the power that knowledge
gives.”4
In view of this, asserting access to information seems paramount to self-
governance. Every day reporters try to fulfill this duty through various
mechanisms. But in our current environment, they are often competing
with an unparalleled glut of information that readers absorb from the mo-
ment they wake up to the moment they power down their devices at night.
One study by Northeastern University estimated that the size of the “digi-
tal universe” of data was 4.4 zettabytes in 2013—and is scheduled to jump
to 44 zettabytes by 2020.5 ii According to a Forbes magazine piece in 2015,
“More data ha[d] been created in the past two years than in the entire
previous history of the human race.”6 iii
This voluminous amount of information has led to massive shifts in the
news industry for nearly a decade. Since about 2008, the explosion of data
ii. Note that this statistic does not underscore how amazingly large a zettabyte is.
iii. These changes are due to various causes, including greater access to technology,
an increase in data-tracking technology, as well as vertical-to-horizontal shifts in various
information industries. In addition to the increase in the quantity of data, the ability
to access information has never been easier. By 2014, 90 percent of adult Americans
owned a mobile phone. In fact, according to one 2014 study by the International Busi-
ness Times, cellphones now outnumber people on Earth (Zachary Davies Boren, “Active
Mobile Phones Outnumber Humans For the First Time,” International Business Times,
October 8, 2014, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/there-are-more-gadgets-there-are-people-
world-1468947 ).
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journalism—defined as journalism that heightens the role numerical infor-
mation plays in storytelling—is now a driving force in newsrooms around
the country. Journalists are quickly learning how to obtain troves of data
through electronic leaks, drones, and cutting-edge computer programs that
sometimes require little more than the click of a button to access informa-
tion. In other instances, journalists confronted with processing large swaths
of information must employ complicated algorithmic and programming
skills. Many larger news organizations have even built internal digital pro-
grams and tools to sort through these data swells and leaks—as was done
with the Panama Papers.iv
As the Global Investigative Journalism Network reported in 2015, “After
nearly 50 years of journalists using data, it is clear that data is not only a
routine part of journalism, but also a driving force for stories.”7 A recent
report by Google stated that 42 percent of reporters use data to tell stories
regularly, and 51 percent of all news organizations in the United States
and Europe now have a dedicated data journalist—a figure that rises to 60
percent for digital-only publications.8
While data has become integral to reporting the news, the quantity of
data at large and the celerity with which it can spread have led to many
journalistic concerns over protecting sources, the accuracy of published
information, the inability to provide meaningful redactions, and journalistic
iv. Leaks will be used synonymously with whistleblowing in this report. Investigative
reporter Seymour Hersh, among many others, argues that “leak” is a pejorative term,
and “tip” or “whistleblowing” are better words. This report does not suggest that leak is
a pejorative word. Whistleblowing and leaking, in this context, refer to “the act of pro-
viding confidential information to the public in a surreptitious way and without official
authorization.” Information, here, includes national security information relating to de-
fense against transnational terrorism, which is protected by the three classification levels
currently in place: Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential. This is different from planting,
which is an authorized disclosure that plays a critical role in policymaking and communi-
cations, allowing the government to disseminate information, frame narrative, and gauge
the reactions of both the people and Congress. Historically, a government employee or
contractor would get in touch with members of the press and provide them with a tip,
which journalists had to investigate and confirm prior to publishing. It is also worth
noting that whistleblowers aren’t unique to government employees. They also come out
of private corporations and can have an equally big impact. For example, the Panama
Papers consisted of 11.5 million leaked documents from Mossack Fonseca, a law firm in
Panama that helped people open offshore accounts. However, different legal considera-
tions apply to government whistleblowers than they do to private whistleblowers, such as
the Espionage Act. This report focuses on the former.
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liability. Meanwhile, corporations and governments, which hold much of the
information that journalists are responsible for reporting on, are beginning
to exercise stricter controls over their data—in many cases by asserting
that it is proprietary information. Federal and local governments are also
guarding their information by expanding exemptions under the Freedom of
Information Act, and increasingly asserting privacy exemptions on behalf of
individuals and corporations alike. Similarly, private companies are exerting
stronger trade secret exemptions, with governments upholding those claims
in even the most dubious circumstances.
While several reports have covered in depth what data journalism is
and how to implement it at various institutions, no recent studies have
discussed how this change in storytelling is subject to the legal landscape
journalists must work within. Traditionally, media law concerns around
newsgathering have been limited to questions about trespass, recording
laws, access to illegally obtained material, and the potential for prosecu-
tion under the Espionage Act. These leading doctrines surely still apply,
but there are shifts in case law and arguments that have yet to be fully ex-
plored in media law casebooks and conversations. This report is an attempt
to tease out some of those new conversations and explore how various case
law is being affected by our data addiction.






Perhaps the most worrisome legal concern related to the increase in data
collection is possible liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4) for data “scraping,” a data collection technique that
usually relies on automation—through bots, crawlers, or applications—to
extract data from a website. For investigative journalists, in particular,
scraping has become “one of the most powerful techniques for data-savvy
journalists who want to get to the story first, or find exclusives that no one
else has spotted.”9 While gathering data from public resources and directly
requesting data from corporations rarely puts journalists at risk of legal
liability, trying to scrape corporate data can incur severe civil and even
criminal penalties under the statute. Several reporters are on record de-
scribing stories that have been blocked because of legal concerns associated
with the CFAA. The CFAA, then, presents real obstacles to reporting out
stories important to the public’s interest. Thus, as data journalism increas-
ingly becomes “a good way of getting to the truth of things . . . in this
post-truth era,” as one data journalist told Google,10 the need for further
clarity around the CFAA increases.
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Data scraping
“[W]eb scraping has become an increasingly useful tool for reporters who
know how to code,” wrote Nael Shiab, a reporter for the Global Investiga-
tive Journalism Network,”11 in a 2015 article that cited several projects
where reporters working a variety of beats wrote Python scripts to collect
data.12
But even among those who don’t specialize in coding,13 scraping is a
popular journalistic technique—and has been for years. A Knight Lab
article in 2014 shared a list of five new web-scraping tools useful for jour-
nalists,14 and in 2016 Sophie Chou of MIT Media Lab reported on its rise
across the journalism industry.15 For specialists, too, the field is growing.
In 2016, Ricardo Brom, an Argentinian data journalist, alongside David
Eads of NPR, Amanda Hickman of BuzzFeed, and Martin Burch of The
Wall Street Journal, presented a panel on data scraping at NICAR16, a
computer-assisted reporting conference run by Investigative Reporters and
Editors.
Indeed, many essential stories from the past several years were born
from data-scraping projects. In 2017, ProPublica journalists unveiled a
project investigating Amazon’s pricing algorithm. Using a “software pro-
gram that simulated a non-Prime Amazon member,” the team looked “at
250 frequently purchased products over several weeks,” while also scraping
product listing pages. What they found was that Amazon was prioritizing
its own products and those from vendors that pay for its services, while
often hiding the best deals from its customers.16 The story was one of many
highlighting increasing concerns around the use of algorithms in industry.
Some news organizations use scraping daily to keep their ongoing projects
up to date. For instance, Reveal from the Center for Investigative Report-
ing (disclosure: where the author works) uses scraping to keep its data jour-
nalism project “The Lost & The Found” contemporaneous. Every night,
Reveal uses Python to scrape a federal database of thousands of missing
persons and unidentified bodies to see which cases are new, which have
changed, and which have been removed or solved. Similarly for a story
about the housing crash, Reveal wrote a scraper to get data on land con-
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tract sales in Detroit after the government refused to disclose it unless an
hourly fee was paid. The process took weeks.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution has gone even further, developing mul-
tiple scrapers for a national investigation called “Doctors & Sex Abuse.”17
When its reporters’ public record requests to medical boards and regula-
tory agencies in every state yielded very little return, the newsroom’s data
journalism team wrote multiple scripts that crawled the regulators’ web-
sites to obtain the board orders—which were hidden not by classification
or court order, but by obscurity. The scrapers retrieved more than 100,000
disciplinary documents used in the yearlong investigation. The project was
a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting in 2017.
A recent blockbuster project by Julia Angwin at ProPublica relied on
scraped data to report a piece that used the publication’s Facebook Polit-
ical Ad Collector extension for Google’s Chrome browser. On its website,
ProPublica says of this process: “The extension, which we call the Political
Ad Collector, is a small piece of software that users can add to their web
browsers. When a user logs into Facebook, the extension will collect the ads
displayed on the user’s News Feed and guess which ones are political based
on an algorithm built by ProPublica.”18
Since scraping can carry the threat of legal liability under the CFAA,
various news organizations have built tools that effectively work around the
potential legal implications. For instance, in this case, rather than scrape
data from Facebook directly, ProPublica’s Political Ad Collector explicitly
informs users about the scope of data collected, and the users who opt
in allow their computers to perform the data collection on ProPublica’s
behalf, minimizing (if not eliminating) ProPublica’s liability under CFAA.19
The extension then collects political ads from users’ Facebook pages and
sends it to ProPublica, which helps “shine a light on political advertising
on Facebook.”20 In keeping with the open nature of the project, ProPublica
open-sources all the related data it collects.21 Other, simpler techniques
to avoid liability involve scraping sites or parts of the internet that are
unlikely to trigger litigation. A recent Medium post by Lauren Glass, for
example, describes how to scrape a Google search result.22 Similarly, in its
housing crisis project, Reveal first entered credit card information into the
government database by hand before employing the scraper to ensure that
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
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it followed government protocol but used the scraper to gather information
efficiently.
Academics also scrape. Researchers from the Harvard Business School
published an article focused on racial discrimination on Airbnb, gathering
data through “inquiries to Airbnb hosts using web browser automation
tools” that was all collected using scrapers.23 The study found that people
with distinctly African-American names were 16 percent less likely to have
their rental requests accepted compared to identical guests with distinctly
white names.24
While scraping is becoming a regular tool for people from many fields,
governments and corporations oftentimes don’t welcome it. “Web scrap-
ing activity often sets the interests of a website owner against those who
want to harvest the data,” noted one guide around best web scraping prac-
tices for publishers.25 “Owners usually want to control, profit from, or
leverage the data they have on their website,” and journalists’ excavation
of this data threatens these resources.26 Currently, governments and pri-
vate companies store troves of data on people, their preferences, and their
networks—personal and professional—that allow them to influence citizens
and product users. It’s common practice for companies to use algorithms
that determine the content users see, while simultaneously allowing ad-
vertisers to micro-target very specific classes of people without users ever
knowing about it. Recent research has also unveiled how algorithms can
hold important sway over users through implicit bias.27 28
Large companies and technology platforms hold a lot of control over the
public through gathering its user data, and remain largely unregulated in
the United States—often under the claim that the industry “self-regulates”
and that the data companies collect should be considered a trade secret.
Moreover, companies rarely make this data available to universities, re-
searchers, or think tanks, limiting the ability of outside institutions to hold
them accountable for misuse or educate users about the way they may be
receiving influenced information. Since the Cambridge Analytica scandal
and recent congressional hearings around Facebook’s data breach, there
may be change in this realm. More specifically, it is increasingly likely that
companies will try to self-regulate and make various information even more
difficult to access and review, triggering an ever greater need for reporters
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and academics to continue their work advocating for more transparency
and access to information as algorithms and data sets become distinctly
determinative factors in our lives.
And while researching through data and scraping techniques have be-
come the most efficient way to keep a check on publicly influential institu-
tions, the specter of legal liability is palpably present. Several independent
journalists and newsrooms accessing data not available through companies’
APIs have indeed declined to publish stories for fear of liability under the
CFAA.
Traditional and new legal doctrines
Before understanding more about the CFAA, it is important to note that
private industry has and continues to use a variety of legal strategies to
deter journalists and other researchers from collecting data. Traditional
doctrines including trespass, copyright, fraud, and breach of contract are
among the first recourses for threatened companies. But since these le-
gal claims are not as tenable in the online space—or as caustic—they are
therefore not as deterrent.
Trespass, for instance, has been asserted in cases of web crawling. How-
ever, the idea of trespass has ostensibly become a “norm of the Web.”29 v
Thus, courts have been reluctant to compare a robot that “enters” a web-
site to an unauthorized intruder who enters a “brick and mortar” location.vi
As noted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in an amicus brief, “Open
access is a hallmark of today’s Internet, and one of the main reasons the
Internet has become our ‘modern public square.’ ” Even more consequen-
tial is that trespass generally requires some harm to a property in order to
have damages. This is a key difference between digital and physical unau-
thorized access. While stepping onto someone’s property and altering their
belongings may conceivably cause harm, in the case of web crawling, bots
rarely cause harm to the business by crawling for data (with the exception
of sometimes slowing traffic to the site).vii
v. See Ebay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc, 100 F. Supp, 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal 2000).
vi. Ibid.
vii. See Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc, 100 F. Supp, 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal 2000) (stating
“[i]f BE’s activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage other auction
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
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Similarly, copyright claims are rarely viable. For instance, in Ticketmas-
ter Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., a California federal district court doubted
the potential misappropriation claims of data under the Copyright Act.viii
Ticketmaster alleged that Tickets.com wrongfully used software to scrape
information from Ticketmaster’s website. The court found that because
copyright law protects neither facts nor compilations of facts,ix Ticket-
master could not claim copyright infringement. The court emphasized the
danger of protecting factual data under copyright claims, since it is nor-
mally open to public use. Moreover, given that a great deal of the content
posted on websites (such as social media sites and online retailers) is cre-
ated by users, platforms are rarely able to assert copyright claims on their
own behalf—because copyright is held by the creator of the content and
various sites are merely custodians of that information, not the creators.
Still, some tactics of redress against scraping work better than others.
Corporations have successfully used contract claims as a defense against
web scraping, typically by treating the site’s terms of service as a contract
and prohibiting the act therein. In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the
defendant developed a scraping program to harvest publicly accessible
WHOIS domain registrant email addresses; the plaintiff asserted that its
terms of use had been violated.x That claim was successful, but in other
cases terms of use that purport to restrict the use of data, but which do not
require an “individualized step to limit access are unenforceable in many
jurisdictions.”xi Some have also argued that scraping does not trigger a
aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay system such that eBay
would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability,
or data losses”); but see Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724,
2001 WL 1736382, at *11-*13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (declining to dismiss trespass
claim).
viii. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff’d 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
ix. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344, 348 (1991).
x. 356 F.3d 393, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2004)
xi. See Nicholas A. Wolfe, “Hacking the Anti-Hacking Statute,” N.Western J. L. and
Tech., 13, 2015 (citing Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff’d 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001); Feist Publ’ns, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
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contractual arrangement precisely because a bot can neither understand nor
agree to the terms of service.
Facing the overall inconsistency of these protections, corporations have
taken steps to assert claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, of-
ten called a blunt and outdated “anti-hacking” statute. The CFAA is a law
passed in 1986 that imposes criminal as well as civil liability on “whoever
. . . intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected
computer”—which includes all computers connected to the internet.xii The
statute, inspired by the 1980s film War Games, was intended to penalize
hackers for breaking and entering into another person’s computer.xiii The
first edition of the statute narrowly criminalized breaking into a computer
to obtain national security secrets, consumer credit, or financial informa-
tion, or to “hack” into government computers.xiv In contrast, the current
version leaves open criminality for a much broader set of actions that fall
under any kind of “unauthorized access.”
While no journalist has ever been convicted of either civil or criminal
charges under the CFAA, the act has been used to prosecute journalistic
sources who have uncovered information in the public interest. In March
2013, security researcher Andrew Auernheimer (also known as “Weev”)
was sentenced to 41 months in prison for revealing an AT&T security hole
by obtaining the personal data of more than 100,000 iPad users from the
company’s publicly accessible website—not by “hacking,” but by deducing
how the site presented information—and then sharing the information
with Gawker.30 31 32 The same year, journalists at Scripps News who found
sensitive phone customer records of TerraCom and YourTel America users
through a Google search and made the weakness public by reporting on the
issue were dubbed “hackers” by the company and threatened with a CFAA
violation in a letter.33
xii. 18 U.S.C. §§1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(e)(2)(B)
xiii. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
98894, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 369192, 369597 (1984); S. Rep. No. 99432, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2480 (1986)) (stating the statute was meant “to address ‘computer
crime,’ which was then principally understood as ‘hacking’ or trespassing into computer
systems or data.”)
xiv. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190,
codified at 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(1)(3).
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Civil liberties advocates, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
have long argued that confusion around the application of this law could
have a chilling effect on the research of journalists and academics. On sim-
ilar grounds, the ACLU filed suit last year in federal court in the United
States’ District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of the CFAA
on behalf of a variety of academics, as well as First Look Media, the parent
company of investigative news outlet The Intercept. In its complaint, the
ACLU argued that the law criminalizes research that might break a site’s
terms of service by simply using its public-facing data for research, and that
this type of penalty chills reporting and academic study because it threat-
ens any number of uses of public data without making clear which ones the
law considers legitimate.
Language of the CFAA
The essential unknown under the CFAA is what constitutes accessing a
computer “without authorization.” Currently, the federal circuit courts are
split on this issue. Four appeals courts (including the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuit) have broadly interpreted the statute to include viola-
tions of a corporation’s terms of use policies. This broad definition frames
“authorization in terms of the computer owner’s intentions, expectations,
and contractual or agency relationships,” meaning that a broad spectrum
of behavior may be subject to criminal liability as long as a company lists
the infraction in its terms of service. Under this interpretation, a company
need only prohibit “scraping” or “data collection” in its terms of service to
trigger CFAA protections.
However, some circuits have tried to limit this broad liability without
explicit direction. For instance, in a Ninth Circuit case, Power Ventures,
which the Supreme Court recently denied for cert, the Court of Appeals
clarified that a violation of the terms of use of a website plus some other
additional factor—which has not been specified—could ostensibly establish
liability under the CFAA. The “additional factor” could be as simple as
refusing to comply with a cease and desist letter, which would demonstrate
that the complainant had proactively revoked access and that the infringer
was on notice. But as Judge Stephen Reinhardt warned in his dissenting
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opinion in a prior Ninth Circuit opinion called Nosal, there still stands
the overall concern that solely relying on a company’s policy “would base
criminal liability on system owners’ access policies,” which creates a myriad
of problems, given that it would effectively allow tech companies to pass
unconstitutionally vague criminal laws by fiat.34 Other courts have also
noted that the imprecise meaning of “without authorization . . . has proven
to be elusive,” making it an unconstitutional way to define criminality.xv
By contrast to the Ninth Circuit, a minority number of appeals courts,
including the Second and Fourth Circuits, go even further, narrowly con-
struing the CFAA as an anti-hacking statute that only penalizes access if it
amounts to “breaking and entering” a computer—as was initially intended
by Congress. In 2015, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Valle
that a narrow interpretation of the CFAA is “consistent with the statute’s
principal purpose of addressing the problem of hacking, i.e., trespass into
computer systems or data”xvi Similarly, in 2012 the Fourth Circuit in WEC
Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller stated it could not “contravene
Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into
a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers or infor-
mation in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy.”xvii Under these more
narrow interpretations, a company “authorizes” use of data stored on its
computers simply by providing a means of access. Legal scholars, like Orin
Kerr, have analogized password authorization to the idea of a key to an
apartment that can be shared with third parties.35 Both passively allow
outsiders access to the company, negating criminality.
Two of the most recent legal decisions involving web scraping suggest a
favorable future for its allowance under the CFAA. Decided in the Northern
District of California in late 2017, hiQ Labs v. LinkedInxviii “signals a shift
in the way courts may be viewing attempts to restrict data scraping, giving
web scrapers some arrows in their legal quiver to get back against recent
opinions condemning scraping.”36 The dispute arose from hiQ’s business
model: The company scrapes and analyzes information from LinkedIn and
xv. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir.
2001).
xvi. 807 F.3d 508, 526 (2d Cir. 2015)
xvii. 687 F.3d at 207
xviii. No. 17-CV-03301-EMC, 2017 WL 3473663 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017)
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markets the resulting insights to clients interested in information about
their own employees, such as whether workers are looking for a new job.
In May 2017, LinkedIn sent hiQ a cease and desist letter, demanding the
company immediately stop collecting data from its public profiles. HiQ
then filed a declaratory action asking the court to state that it had not
violated and would not violate any laws with its scraping.
The court decided in favor of hiQ, reasoning that outlawing such access
would effectively make it illegal to view public information. This type of
penalty could “lead to perverse consequences, effectively allowing websites
to criminalize access to [a private company’s] public site on the basis of
discrimination or anti-competitive intent.” The court further explained that
if “merely viewing a website in contravention of a unilateral directive from
a private entity would be a crime,” the law would become, in effect, “the
digital equivalence of Medusa.”
The opinion is a strong aberration from other, more meek Ninth Circuit
case law, which in applying this “unauthorized access” language had found
that parties accessing computers after an express revocation of permission
(such as a cease and desist letter) had violated the CFAA. In the Power
Ventures case, a three-judge panel said the company violated the CFAA
because it knew it wasn’t authorized to access Facebook’s computers after
receiving the cease and desist letter. However, hiQ differs factually in at
least one significant way: the LinkedIn data isn’t password-protected, unlike
the information accessed by Power Ventures. Regardless, the impending
influence of hiQ seems palpable.xix
xix. This position was recently upheld by the Ninth Circuit in a case dealing with Cali-
fornia’s computer crime law. In Oracle v. Rimini, the federal court of appeals held that
a company could not be held criminally liable for accessing Oracle’s website in a man-
ner that violated the website’s terms of use. This particular case history is noteworthy
because it dates back to a 2012 decision that held a violation of Oracle’s terms of use is
not a crime under the CFAA. Hoping to circumvent this ruling, Oracle then turned to
the state computer crime statutes of California and Nevada—to enforce the company’s
terms of use. In this case, Rimini violated Oracle’s provisions by using automated scripts
to download data from the website in bulk, instead of downloading each file individually.
Oracle sent Rimini a cease and desist letter and while Rimini did stop collection tem-
porarily, it soon resumed using the scripts. Although Oracle sued Rimini and won on the
district court level under both the California and Nevada computer crime statutes, on
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s rulings, stating that when “a com-
puter user has permission and authorization to access and use the computer or data” it
does not become a crime simply because the user then accesses or uses the information
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Indeed, a similar case decided this year also appeared to follow suit. In
2016 the ACLU filed its lawsuit, Sandvig v. Sessions, in federal court in
Washington, D.C., challenging the constitutionality of the CFAA—based
in part on the fact that it violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.xx
There, the ACLU represented scholars and a media organization The Inter-
cept, who were scraping information to identify and understand how racism
is implemented in algorithms. The action charged that 1032(A)(2)(c) of the
CFAA, which allows terms of service to determine criminal violations under
the CFAA, hinders important research, and is not only vague but also vio-
lates the First Amendment. In its complaint, the ACLU argued that crim-
inalizing a violation of a term of service has a chilling effect on researchers
and journalists by thwarting them from collecting data. The complaint
states: “Refraining from conducting their research, testing, or investigations
constitutes self-censorship and a loss of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.”
Prior to the decision being issued, Esha Bhandari, an attorney for the case,
explained that “not being able to record information that is otherwise avail-
able to the public” is a clear First Amendment concern.
In the court’s decision, which it issued March 30, 2018, during the writ-
ing of this paper, the district court denied in part and granted in part the
government’s motion to dismiss, allowing the case to proceed and address
the merits of one of the ACLU’s First Amendment claims. United States
District Judge John Bates wrote:
First, scraping plausibly falls within the ambit of the First Amendment.
“The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.”xxi The Supreme
Court has made a number of recent statements that give full First Amend-
ment application to the gathering and creation of information. Additionally,
six courts of appeals have found that individuals have a First Amendment
right to record at least some matters of public interest in order to preserve
and disseminate ideas.
While this language does not directly address the question of the First
in a manner the website owner does not like. This finding likely signaled the positive
decision in the Ninth Circuit opinion in hiQ v. LinkedIn.
xx. Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 16-1368 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018)
xxi. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)
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Amendment, it opens the door to a First Amendment challenge to the
CFAA, as it is the closest a court has come to saying that research done
through scraping may be protected free speech, and therefore the CFAA is
unconstitutional.
Moreover, while the court’s opinion did not cite the press clause but
instead the First Amendment “right to record,” the court seemed to ac-
knowledge the important impact the CFAA had on the news media by
citing a foundational press case: Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527
(2001). In that case, a radio station that obtained an illegally taped con-
versation was not held liable for broadcasting the tape. The 2001 decision
came to stand for the proposition that information illegally obtained by
a source does not legally implicate a journalist who chooses to share that
information—as long as the journalist had no hand in obtaining the data
and the publication of the information was in the public interest. This
principle is incredibly important for journalists and the news industry.xxii
On page 16 of the court’s opinion in Sandvig, Judge Bates cites Bartnicki
after writing “plaintiffs contend that they have the right, and the desire, to
publish the results of their research, and that some sites’ ToS prohibit them
from doing so without prior permission or else employ anti-disparagement
clauses.” More specifically, it continued:
The Supreme Court has made very clear that the right to publish falls
within the core of the First Amendment’s protections. See, e.g., Bartnicki
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (“As a general matter, ‘state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitu-
tional standards.’ ” (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 102 (1979)). Applying criminal sanctions for publishing original material
that uses publicly available information, or for making negative statements
about a website, triggers First Amendment scrutiny.
Through this langauge the court appears to underscore that information
scraped by a confidential source—even criminally—and given to an outlet
may be published without sanctions. This would, at the very least, shield
xxii. For instance, it ostensibly protected The New York Times’s Suzanne Craig when
she posted about her interest in President Trump’s tax returns, even if illegally obtained.
Similarly, it continually protects news organizations which may obtain scraped informa-
tion from sources, even sources who have violated the CFAA.
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publications that obtain data from sources or hackers like Weev or others
who may illegally scrape sites.
Legal and practical tips
While these recent decisions support some cautious optimism among data
journalists and their attorneys, the still uncertain state of the law leaves
journalists who scrape data, especially in violation of a site’s terms of ser-
vice, at risk of both civil and criminal liabilities. For that reason, there are
a few tips to consider. It is important to emphasize that these are in no
way exhaustive and that if you are dealing with a legal issue involving data
scraping, you should speak to an attorney about the situation.
1. Legal tactics
In many circumstances, journalists using data collected by a source—even
if done illegally—may escape liability under precedent from Bartnicki v.
Vopper. Even before the Sandvig decision, several newsrooms changed how
they collected data to create protection for the outlet under Bartnicki.
For instance, where the public or a source collects the data, a journalist’s
liability for data scraping can be circumvented, as information gathering
by the public is less noticeable and less likely to be prosecuted under the
statute.
However, given the Sandvig decision, there is now an even stronger claim
that the journalists analyzing and researching are protected under their
right to record, a long-established First Amendment right. This legal av-
enue is especially valuable to the press, given that the news media has often
been found to have strong protections to record even where there were ex-
tant privacy concerns. For instance, in 1995 the Seventh Circuit found that
while journalists were possibly liable for breaking onto private property of
an opthamologist to cover a story under theories of trespass, privacy con-
cerns were distinct and likely unhindered.xxiii In essence, where a reporter
xxiii. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that
“there is no journalists’ privilege to trespass,” however, noting that the journalists “en-
tered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services and
videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal, communications with
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goes into circumstances as a normal citizen might, and then attempts to
somehow record that information, they may be protected despite privacy
claims.
As law professor Margot Kaminski ably discussed in a recent law re-
view article, privacy laws that constrain recording can be cast as speech-
targeting laws.xxiv And while the CFAA is not a privacy law per se, the
same principles seem to apply. While data may be on private property of
various online sites, First Amendment concerns may outweigh any privacy
or other considerations, especially where there is a public interest in pub-
lication of that material. This is especially important as privacy concerns
about data increase in response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, per-
haps making the CFAA more alluring to some.
Regardless, it is important to note that without attorneys and more
protection from the CFAA, journalists who do not have a larger newsroom
supporting them with tools are often unable to tell certain stories. For
instance, one unnamed journalist for a major news outlet built a tool to
scrape information from a Silicon Valley company. The outlet told the
journalist he could not collect the data himself for fear of violating the
CFAA. While the journalist could have gotten the information using a
tool like the kind employed by ProPublica, the Center for Investigative
Reporting, and Gizmodo, he was unable to do so as a freelancer without
access to a similar forum. Moreover, the tool would not have been able
to obtain all the important data that the journalist would have wanted to
collect. Stories like this one are not uncommon.
2. Practical ideas
To address CFAA concerns, journalists, lawyers, and ethicists have dis-
cussed what can be done to limit liability when scraping is necessary.37
First, reporters should always pay attention to the terms of service of
strangers (the testers themselves)”); see also Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Cos., 121 F.3d
460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding two years later the Ninth Circuit granted newsgatherers
greater protection where privacy concerns arose, suggesting that the privacy laws were no
longer inscrutable laws of general applicability).
xxiv. Justin Marceau and Alan K. Chen, “Free Speech and Democracy in the Video
Age,” 116 Columbia Law Review, 991, 997–98 (2016) (arguing that the First Amendment
protects recording even when it occurs in a privately owned space)
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the website they’re accessing to understand whether the company prohibits
scraping, even if its data is accessible. When reviewing the terms of use,
there often is a section discussing bots, scripts, or other methods for collect-
ing information from the site. Journalists should ensure that they are fully
aware of what precisely the terms of use prohibit. If they cannot determine
what those terms are saying, they should reach out to an attorney.
Second, if the terms of use prohibit data scraping, reporters should first
seek alternate sources for the information, bits and pieces of which may
be available on other sites or via public records requests. Unfortunately,
companies have increasingly used trade secret exemptions to thwart disclo-
sure of their information via public record requests. And, as The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution’s “Doctors & Sex Abuse” case shows, public records
requests do not always recover sufficient information. Data may have to be
obtained from some third party available to you.
However, if the information exists only on a company’s site, it can be a
good idea to contact the company and see if they will simply turn over the
information. John Muyskens, a reporter at The Wall Street Journal, told
the Tow Center that this approach not only often works but has helped
journalists develop industry contacts. In some cases, this may even lead
to a company representative proactively reaching out to the requesting
journalist, knowing that they may report on the information. Of course,
in some instances, journalists may be wary of putting a company on notice
that they intend to scrape the site.
Regardless, whether they contact the company or not, reporters should
always diminish the risk of injury to the company or other individuals
through whatever methods possible. For example, building a tool that
accesses the information in a way that performs individual downloads
or piecemeal scraping might be less likely to trigger liability. Journalists
should be careful not to build any tool that might overwhelm a company’s
servers. Additionally, if any sensitive data with privacy concerns is col-
lected, journalists should be careful to redact and employ ethical jour-
nalistic standards, such as those advocated by the Society of Professional
Journalists.
Perhaps most importantly, journalists should be good citizens and ensure
that any data collection is done in the public interest. They should have
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a clear reason why they need specific information, rather than going on
fishing expeditions and scraping in the hope of finding a story. On that
point, Nieman Lab recommends keeping “track of process, so that a step-
by-step narrative of what steps were taken and why can be presented if
necessary.”38
Finally, media institutions may wish to look to groups like the Electronic
Frontier Foundation for guidance. The EFF and similar groups have long
offered guidance on the CFAA. Recently, the organization recognized the
statute’s negative effects on journalism, writing in an amicus brief that the
court’s reading of the CFAA “threatens to chill socially valuable research,
journalism, and testing online, much of which is protected First Amend-
ment activity.”39 The group argues that the “investigative techniques of
these journalists and academic researchers sometimes require violating spe-
cific company prohibitions on certain activities, and are often adversarial to






Arguably, no other tool is more powerful in bringing transparency to gover-
nance than the Freedom of Information Act. In 1966, Congress passed the
Act in response to Cold War concerns about corruption and government
secrecy.xxv At that time, the United States was only the second country
in the world to adopt a freedom of information law, and the statute de-
manding government transparency was considered an indispensable tool for
journalists seeking to shed light on government corruption. Indeed, jour-
nalists were at the forefront of the push that led to the Act’s adoption.xxvi
As some have stated, “FOIA was . . . designed largely by journalists, for
journalists, and with the particular goal in mind that journalists would use
access to government information to provide knowledge to the public.”xxvii
Many aspects of FOIA make it a powerful statute. In addition to estab-
lishing a presumption in favor of disclosure, the Act permits any person—
citizen or not—to request records, without requiring them to provide a
reason or justification for the request. Moreover, FOIA only has nine ex-
emptions that are meant to be “narrowly drawn,” according to case law,
in order to justify withholding under the statute. State and federal courts
have consistently recognized FOIA as vital to promoting transparency.xxviii
xxv. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2418, 2429.
xxvi. See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 Duke Law Journal, 1361, 1369–71 (2016)
xxvii. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. at 1371.
xxviii. See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,
242 (1978) (noting that “[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry,
vital to the functioning of a democratic society”); Kish v. City of Akron, 2006-Ohio-
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Over the years, thousands of journalists have used FOIA and its state-
level progenyxxix to uncover important stories critical to the public inter-
est.41 Stories have varied from how many cans of Ensure the government
bought to force-feed detainees at Guantanamo Bay, to documents unveiling
waterboarding techniques, to how in Obama’s final year the US spent $36
million in records lawsuits.42 43 44 Investigative journalists are especially re-
liant on the statute. Some have even built a career on it. For instance, as a
senior investigative reporter at BuzzFeed, Jason Leopold has created a cot-
tage industry profession around FOIA. He has even been named a “FOIA
terrorist” by several agencies, which amounts to an immense honor among
transparency advocates.
While FOIA has always been a valuable tool, its use has increased
markedly as the intrigue and value in data has escalated. To date, the
total number of requests made on all agencies has increased by over a third
from a decade ago, jumping from 557,825 in 2008 to nearly 800,000 in 2016.
This increased use is not limited to journalists, however. Reporters ac-
count for only a small share of FOIA requests (approximately 7.6 percent
according to a 2017 study by FOIAMapper.com).45 Instead, the majority
of FOIA requests come from a diverse ecosystem of “lawyers, nonprofits,
academic researchers, hospitals, political committees, hedge funds and cor-
porations.”46
The mechanization of FOIA has even been realized by artists and ac-
tivists. For instance, activist Parker Higgins wrote a script that lets him
automatically send a FOIA request for the FBI file of every public figure
listed in The New York Times’s obituary pages. (It’s probably fair to say
that this has contributed to Mr. Higgins being on the FBI’s Vexsome Filer
list, which also was revealed by a FOIA request.)47 Even more notably,
Michael Best, an activist from the transparency advocacy organization
MuckRock, which requests, analyzes, and shares government documents to
1244, 17 (noting that “[s]uch statutes . . . reinforce the understanding that open access
to government papers is an integral entitlement of the people, to be preserved with vigi-
lance and vigor”).
xxix. Today, in addition to the federal FOIA, all 50 states and the District of Columbia
have adopted an open record law, and more than 100 countries around the world have
also followed suit. See, e.g., Herald Publ’g Co. v. Barnwell, 351 S.E.2d 878, 881 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting that all 50 states have adopted open records laws).
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promote government transparency, wrote a script automatically request-
ing files on nearly 7,000 dead FBI employees and released that script to
permit others to create similar projects. In a quote for Motherboard, Best
said, “I think simple tools like that can be turned into ’weapons of mass
transparency.”’48
Unfortunately, the abundant and vigorous exercise of the statute, cou-
pled with both the increase in the amount of data created by the govern-
ment and corporate incentives behind acquiring data, has led to problems
with the current implementation of the statute. Many academics, includ-
ing David Pozen at Columbia Law School, have taken to critiquing these
problems with the legislation by highlighting that the system creates an
antagonistic posture between public and citizen, and doesn’t focus on other
places of interest like corporate accountability.49 50 Similarly, faculty mem-
bers at Syracuse University tracking FOIA have produced a number of
studies finding the less than satisfactory efficacy of FOIA. Attorney Mark
Zaid, a member of the National Archives and Records Administration, said
that while “there are a lot of excellent FOIA officers,” there are some that
don’t have the resources; then others like those from the CIA “go out of
their way to be difficult.”51 52 53
Given these criticisms, in 2015 Congress held a hearing about the de-
clining efficacy of the statute, discussing delay, the misuse of certain Ex-
emptions, the lack of responsiveness, and the few resources allocated to
FOIA offices. At the hearing, Representative Timothy Walberg (D-Mich.)
noted that only 30 percent of all FOIA requests resulted in full disclosure
in 2013.xxx The vice president and assistant general counsel of The New
York Times, David McCraw, also spoke, discussing how delay often leads
to litigation, which is a misuse of government. His statement highlighted
that delay often occurs because of a “culture of unresponsiveness,” referrals
made to other agencies, and consultations with companies that submitted
the information sought for in the request.54 While the statute was subse-
quently amended in 2015, delays continue to be an issue.
Since the most recent administration’s takeover, various agencies have re-
xxx. “Ensuring Transparency through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),” Hearing
Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives,
June 2, 2015, Serial No. 114–80
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moved public information from their websites and made filing requests more
difficult (by requiring that they not be made by email) and stonewalling
requesters.55 56 In 2017, the White House announced it will no longer vol-
untarily post its visitor logs, breaking with precedent of other presidencies.
And in March of this year, reviewing the Trump administration’s compli-
ance with FOIA, the Associated Press reported that roughly one out of five
FOIA requests is completed fully; other requests were only partially com-
pleted or denied. Moreover, the AP noted that the 2017 annual Office of
Information Policy report on FOIA—which provides statistics on requests
and fulfillment—has not yet been processed.57
Response to this inaction has been tremendous. Activists from Muck-
Rock have suggested holding the Trump administration accountable by
filing more FOIA requests, and starting the “FOIA the Trump Admin-
istration” project and a Slack channel “to share ideas and get help with
your requests.”58 59 A 2017 article in CJR suggests that requests are no
longer sufficient, and recommends most requesters also file an appeal.60
Meanwhile, a review by Politico identified 55 public records lawsuits since
Trump’s inauguration.61 Still, while there is little consensus on the changes
needed, most agree that at least some further overhaul of the law is re-
quired to address the changing issues, given the growing amount of data
subject to FOIA.
Influx of corporate requests and little
corporate transparency
Congress created FOIA to benefit the public, journalists, and academics,
but the Act has long been used as a competitive tool for gain by corpora-
tions.62 As early as 2006, legal scholar Mark Fenster wrote that “frequent
FOIA requesters include businesses that seek the records of competitors for
commercial motivations.”63 Despite common opinion, Fenster and others
have found that federal agencies received only a small percentage of FOIA
requests from journalists.64 In fact, Fenster explained, as the commercial
importance of data has grown, so too has the corporate venture of FOIA.
He added, “One unintended consequence of transparency, then, is the trans-
fer of wealth between corporations inside, as well as outside of, the United
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States when competitors and foreign governments obtain information about
American industry that is submitted to or collected by the government.”65
While FOIA was never meant to necessarily exclude corporations—
stating that a FOIA request “may be made by ‘any person,’ a broad term
that . . . includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or
public or private organizations other than an agency”66—the trend of using
it for corporate gain has intensified in recent years as data becomes more
valuable to corporations. In 2016, for example, legal academic Margaret
B. Kwoka emphasized how “corporations, in pursuit of private profit, have
overrun FOIA’s supremely inexpensive processes and, in so doing, poten-
tially crowded out journalists and other government watchdogs from doing
what the law was intended to facilitate: third-party oversight of govern-
mental actors.”67 Kwoka’s study revealed “a cottage industry of companies
whose entire business model is to request federal records under FOIA and
resell them at a profit, which distorts the transparency system even fur-
ther.” In conjunction, with the growing interest in data, there has been an
increasing number of public records created in government agencies and pri-
vatized arms of government. For instance, in a report issued by the Obama
administration, it mentions that there is more public information than ever
before.68
These trends have had several negative effects on journalists utilizing
FOIA. First, more data and more requests have created increasing delay
for journalists looking for information. This is especially the case as gov-
ernment search capabilities are generally inferior to search abilities in the
private sector. And while the statute suggests that journalists should be
privileged with “expedited processing” and fee waivers, journalists have said
anecdotally that the delay to FOIA has become increasingly pervasive.69
This problem is especially an issue for freelance journalists without access
to lawyers willing to sue on their behalf, as they are otherwise unlikely to
get a response from an agency.70
Second, the increased value of data has encouraged governments to begin
asserting proprietary ownership over documents they hold, demanding that
journalists pay a fee for producing digital information that is inherently
public. Newsrooms have been asked to pay tens of thousands of dollars to
complete public records requests.
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Lastly, the increase in data production, in combination with the priva-
tization of government responsibilities, has led to government control and
possession of corporate information that those businesses are hesitant to
share. Governments have shown increasing warniness around disclosing
private information, leading to a litany of reverse-FOIA actions (i.e., law-
suits brought by corporations under FOIA to shield ostensibly “private”
information from disclosure).71
Delay problems
Under FOIA, an agency is required to respond to a request in 20 days, un-
less the agency claims that special circumstances qualify for an extension.
Delays in FOIA requests have been a perennial issue, but they have been
further exacerbated as the number of documents increases exponentially.
During President Obama’s tenure, backlogs in FOIA across all agencies
more than doubled, increasing from 77,377 in 2009 to 159,741 in 2014.72
In 2012, a Bloomberg News test of the administration’s FOIA practices
found that 19 of 20 agencies failed to disclose public information within the
FOIA’s 20-day time limit, and only eight of 57 agencies processed requests
within the timeframe.73
In part, these delays are a direct result of the rising number of FOIA
requests. From 2009 to 2014, the number of requests increased from 557,825
to 714,231, while the number of full-time government employees assigned to
handle them decreased from 4,396 in 2011 to 3,838 in 2014.74 In the 2017
OIP Report, the government disclosed that the number of requests inflated
even further to 788,769. Since the new president has taken office, this trend
has not improved. The DOJ, which receives a large number of the requests
every year, broke a new record in 2017 with 82,088 requests, compared to
73,103 in 2016 and 67,783 in 2015.75 This steady increase in requests is
in line with the overall numbers, which show approximately 230,000 more
FOIA requests were filed in 2016 than in 2009.76
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Source: Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2016. Office of Informa-
tion Policy, US Department of Justice.
Problems with search
Under FOIA, to achieve the statute’s core purpose of disclosure, an agency
must perform an “adequate search” for all responsive records.xxxi It “must
show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested
records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the
information requested.”xxxii A court will apply “a ‘reasonableness’ test” to
assess whether an agency’s search for responsive records was adequate.xxxiii
This reasonableness test is supposed to be “consistent with congressional
intent tilting the scale in favor of disclosure.”xxxiv However, in demon-
strating the adequacy of the search, an agency may simply rely upon “rea-
sonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” With
xxxi. Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
xxxii. Oglesby v. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir.1990)
xxxiii. Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
xxxiv. Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Weis-
berg v. Dep’t. of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984))
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increasing data, this minimal requirement has become especially delinquent
and unreasonable.
Various requesters have seen the impact of this insufficient standard
in recent years, as challenges to the adequacy of an agency search have
failed. For instance, in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., a court
found it was not enough for a requester to bring “purely speculative claims
about the existence and discoverability of other documents” even where
the likelihood of the documents was nearly certain.xxxv In the case, the
requesting organization sought images of the May 2011 raid on Osama bin
Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The requester argued that the
secretary of defense’s office should have been searched because he was likely
to possess the responsive images. Despite the near certain likelihood of the
documents, the court rejected this argument as “bald conjecture.”
Even more illustrative was a case (which the author of this report
worked on) involving the FBI’s underwhelming search. In that case, the
nonprofit the Freedom of the Press Foundation sued the Justice Depart-
ment under the Freedom of Information Act for rules determining how the
agency employs National Security Letters (NSLs) to investigate journalists
and sources—the controversial tool the FBI uses to conduct surveillance
without any court approval.77 The rules were so certain to exist that a
coalition of three dozen news organizations, including The New York Times
and the Associated Press, demanded that the agency release them.78 In
response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, the FBI conducted a search of its
records and identified 302 pages of records even though the agency did
not yield the requested document containing the actual rules.xxxvi How-
ever, just weeks into the case being filed, The Intercept published a leaked
document titled “Appendix G” that contained the FBI’s secret rules for
targeting journalists’ NSLs. The Intercept’s publication of Appendix G,
which the government did not disclose, brought the government’s search
squarely into question.79
In that case, Judge Haywood Stirling Gilliam Jr. for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the gov-
xxxv. No. 11-890(JEB), 2012 WL 1438688 at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2012)
xxxvi. See Dkt. Freedom of the Press Foundation v. United States Department of Justice
Doc. 51 No. 30–1 (Hardy Decl.) 1721 & Exs. H, I.
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ernment fulfilled its burden to search. The court admitted that the agency
“must show that its search for responsive records was adequate . . . ” and
that the agency should not succeed “if a review of the record raises sub-
stantial doubt, particularly in view of well-defined requests and positive
indications of overlooked materials.”xxxvii Still, the court ruled in favor of
the FBI, stating courts hold “limited institutional expertise on intelligence
matters,” making them particularly reliant on “[a]ffidavits submitted by an
agency to demonstrate the adequacy of its response.” Ultimately, it found
“[b]ecause Plaintiff’s speculation cannot overcome the FBI’s reasonably
detailed, nonconclusory declarations, the Court holds that the FBI has con-
ducted an adequate search for responsive records.” The court effectively
bowed to the agency’s claims that it conducted a reasonable search, even in
these dubious circumstances.
In the course of another case involving the FBI, Shapiro v. Department
of Justice, plaintiff Ryan Shapiro, an MIT doctoral student, also became a
suspect of the FBI’s search techniques. In this case, Shapiro filed 58 FOIA
requests to which the FBI gave him 42 “no records” responses, meaning
that it told him no records existed that were responsive to his requests.
After Shapiro did some investigating, he alleged that the FBI’s software
used to search and respond to FOIA requests was developed in 1995 and
is so old “that it doesn’t even have a graphical user interface, meaning no
mouse or icons.”xxxviii Shapiro said the software performs such rudimentary
searches that they are “akin to searching a card catalog at a library—when
better technology is readily available.” He further alleged that the FBI’s
main records database, the Central Records System, isn’t itself searchable,
and that bureau personnel use a much more powerful search software—
commissioned at tremendous taxpayer expense—which its Office of Infor-
mation Policy refuses to use to conduct FOIA searches.
In 2016, Shapiro successfully sued the FBI over its use of the two-
decades-old database. In his complaint, he cited a 2012 report in which
former FBI Director William H. Webster called ACS “the FBI’s most out-
dated system.”80 As documents continue to multiply, it will be important
xxxvii. Hamdan v. United States Department of Justice, 797 F.3d at 771
xxxviii. Shapiro v. United States Department of Justice, No. 17-5122 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
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that more regimented search standards are imposed, and that people like
Shapiro continue to advocate for more robust search tools.
Equating disclosure of documents
with profit
As data has increasingly gained importance in our society, government offi-
cials have begun to treat public information as proprietary data—as theirs
to sell and profit from. In researching this report, many journalists told
us that they have been asked to pay for an agency’s release of documents
under FOIA. FOIA does account for the possibility of some costs, however,
those costs are reserved for efforts such as copying records.xxxix In addi-
tion, FOIA contains a fee waiver provision requiring that records “shall be
furnished without any charge . . . if disclosure of the information is in the
public interest.xl Still, agencies have attempted to charge for the value of
the data itself.
Perhaps the best example is a FOIA lawsuit filed in federal court in the
District of Columbia, Yanofsky v. United States Department of Commerce,
in which Quartz reporter David Yanofsky requested from the United States
Department of Commerce two databases containing information about for-
eign travel to and from the United States. The data, which is of immense
value to the agency, was not subject to the FOIA, it claimed. According to
the complaint, Yanofsky was told that FOIA was inapplicable and he would
have to purchase the records for $173,775.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the attorneys repre-
senting Yanofsky, put a finer note on the point, stating, “Simply put, the
government can’t hold public information for ransom.” In their brief filed
with the court, they wrote, “Indeed, it should go without saying that the
mere fact that government information may have a commercial value does
xxxix. §552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II), (a)(4)(A)(iv)(II) (stating “representatives of the news media
are entitled to a fee benefit and may be charged only for duplication costs, not including
the first one hundred pages of duplication”)
xl. See also Michael Russo, “Are Bloggers Representatives of the News Media Under
the Freedom of Information Act?,” 40 Columbia Law Review, 225, 228 (Winter 2006)
(“By favoring journalists, with their professional skills and broad distribution networks,
FOIA subsidizes those requests most likely to inform the public.”).
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not mean that government agencies are permitted to charge more than the
cost of dissemination for access to such information. In fact, a wide vari-
ety of commercially valuable government databases are made available to
the public for free.”xli On March 30, 2018, the district court decided in fa-
vor of Yanofsky and determined the agency must follow FOIA’s fee-setting
and fee-waiver provisions rather than charging exorbitatant fees. Still, the
case is a harbinger of the way agencies are beginning to see information the
same way that corporations view it: by dollar value instead of as a means
of “ensur[ing] an informed citizenry.”xlii
Stymieing corporate transparency:
Reverse FOIA actions
Perhaps most concerning is not just that corporations have overused FOIA
as a monetization tool, but that they have also employed it as a shield
against transparency. Corporations hold a privileged position under FOIA,
as they are not subject to the same scrutiny as government agencies. Un-
like some transparency laws abroad, the Act does not require businesses to
disclose information, despite their growing power in our societal structure.
Corporations have taken this privileged position to employ so-called “re-
verse FOIA procedures.” Originally developed by the federal courts in the
1970s, these actions allow private actors (or businesses) that submit suppos-
edly proprietary information to an agency to file suit in hopes of thwarting
disclosure and stopping information from being revealed to a requester. To
be especially cautious, government agencies have begun employing this pro-
cess, giving corporations notice and opportunity to object to requests before
disclosing the information to the public.
For instance, The Center for Investigative Reporting recently filed a
complaint challenging an agency’s determination that corporations can
shield information they have provided to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission. Silicon Valley companies, which are federal contractors,
must file reports to the agency that contain their diversity statistics in or-
xli. Yanofsky v. Department of Commerce, Complaint, Dkt. 21, 27. (2016)
xlii. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quota-
tions omitted)
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der to ensure their compliance with federal law. The agency has asserted
that companies can withhold their consent from releasing the informa-
tion by qualifying the diversity statistics as “trade secrets.” In essence, the
agency and various Silicon Valley companies have argued that their diver-
sity statistics are somehow confidential business information. In a similar
circumstance, a CJR article disclosed that Facebook attempted to create
an arrangement with public officials that required it be given notice about
any relevant public records requests an agency received at least three days
before it responded to them.81 These circumstances are especially troubling,
as private companies are increasingly being contracted to take over public
responsibilities.
One possible solution to corporations’ ability to block the release of
their information—while not comprehensive—would involve heightening
the requirements for transparency. In a recent law review article, David
Pozen discusses the potential for requiring corporations to meet disclosure
requirements similar to those of government agencies.82 While this proposal
has been suggested previously, given the increasing power of Silicon Valley
companies and their recent receptivity to accountability discussions, it
appears that the time for reform is upon us.xliii As Louis Brandeis often
repeated, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”83
Search of a database as creating a
new document
A FOIA request can be made for any agency record. The requester may
also specify the format in which he or she wishes to receive the records.
That said, FOIA does not require agencies to create new records or to con-
duct research, analyze, or answer questions when responding to requests.xliv
FOIA only requires disclosure of extant records, which the agency has de-
cided to create for its own reasons. However, what constitutes creating a
xliii. See also Roy Peled, “Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom of Corporate
Information,” 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 261 (2013).
xliv. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136,
152 & n.7 (1980) (FOIA “does not obligate agencies to create“ records); NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162 (1975).
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new record is uncertain. In fact, Congress did not even attempt to define
this in the statute. Unfortunately, many questions around what constitutes
a document are becoming critical as agencies move to electronic documen-
tation. As the DOJ writes:
Indeed, over the course of the past decade, federal agencies have increas-
ingly “computerized” and automated their records systems—sometimes
entirely replacing their conventional files, sometimes supplementing them,
with more sophisticated “electronic” systems. At many agencies, use of
computer databases as a primary means of records maintenance has be-
come the rule rather than the exception. At others, such automation is just
beginning to take hold. Overall, throughout the federal government, agen-
cies are now moving with increasing swiftness toward the creation of a new
“electronic record” environment in which they can operate with high-tech
speed and efficiency.84
Given this circumstance, it is especially important that agency records
be extended to documents such as databases. However, in the same report,
when agencies were asked: “Does the FOIA require agencies to provide
requested records in the particular forms (or database formats) specified
by requesters?” nearly 60 percent answered in the negative. Increasingly,
FOIA requesters have been denied access to databases, being told that to
conduct a search would require the agency to create a new document.
Recent cases have discussed this issue. In National Security Counselors
v. CIA, the court found that when responding to a request for “aggregate
data” an agency “need not create a new database or reorganize its method
of archiving data,” also noting that “searching that database does not in-
volve the creation of a new record.”xlv The court continued by saying that
“sorting a pre-existing database of information to make information intelli-
gible does not involve the creation of a new record . . . [I]t is just another
form of searching that is within the scope of an agency’s duties in respond-
ing to FOIA requests.” However, the court did note that a request for a
“listing or index of a database’s contents that does not seek the contents
of the database, but instead essentially seeks information about those con-
tents, is a request that requires the creation of a new record, insofar as the
agency has not previously created and retained such a listing or index.”
xlv. Nos. 11-443, 11-444, 11-445, 2012 WL 4903377 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2012) (Howell, J.)
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On the state level, an Illinois court on appeal reversed a lower court in
part, holding that the data requested within the agency’s database (e.g.,
zip codes) were public records under the state FOIA law because such data
is clearly information recorded during a government function performed by
the public body. The court determined that running a search for records
did not constitute creating a new record, just as looking through a file
cabinet for a file does not create a new record. It likewise warned that as
the use of electronic records grows, so does the possibility of an agency
trying to shield public information from review by merely storing it in a
database.
Decided in the opposite direction, the Superior Court in California re-
cently ruled under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) that the
anonymization of records is tantamount to the creation of a new record.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press filed an amicus brief in
the case, Sander & The First Amendment Coalition v. State Bar of Califor-
nia et al., arguing that the ruling “jeopardizes the public’s ability to access
anonymized data from government databases, a vital source of information
about the workings of government.” It continues that the “holding will, as
a practical matter, put many government databases beyond the reach of
the CPRA [because a] number of California government entities subject to
the CPRA collect large amounts of data that may include private infor-
mation that could necessitate redaction or deletion before disclosure under
the Act.”85 Furthermore, legally speaking, the holding goes against the rule
of the CPRA given that “when a record contains both exempt and non-
exempt information, the Act requires ‘deletion’ of portions of the record
that are exempt and that the public be afforded access to non-exempt por-
tions of the record.”xlvi
More recently, the author of this report filed a FOIA lawsuit on behalf
of The Center for Investigative Reporting against the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco Firearm and Explosives (ATF), after the agency claimed that
a search of its database storing gun trace information would be produc-
ing a new document.86 In that case, the court ruled in favor of the ATF,
stating that the request for “statistical aggregate data” from the database
amounted to a new document. There, the court held, “Plaintiff’s request
xlvi. (Gov. Code §6253)
Columbia Journalism School
Data and the Freedom of Information Act 39
for statistical aggregate data derived from the FTS database requires a
compilation of data points—all firearms traced to former law enforcement
ownership since 2006—and seeks information that does not currently ex-
ist.”87
While many courts have acknowledged that searching and anonymizing
a database is not creating a record, questions around what a record is and
rules around analyzing that database are sure to continue. And holding
that searches of electronic databases are tantamount to creating a new
record is sure to create new levels of government secrecy as more public
information is held in these formats.
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In 2014, President Obama issued a report in which he signaled concern aris-
ing from the revolutionary shift in the “volume, variety, and velocity” of
information growing in our society—especially within the walls of govern-
ment.88 The report presaged a variety of hot topics involving government
data and algorithms, including implicit bias and discrimination, artificial
intelligence, and attention deficits. However, hidden in the report, in a
section titled “Insider Threat and Continuous Evaluation,” he suggests
another issue: concern over “a string of troubling breaches and acts of vio-
lence by insiders who held security clearances, including Chelsea Manning’s
disclosures to WikiLeaks . . . and the most serious breach in the history of
U.S. intelligence, the release of classified National Security Agency docu-
ments by Edward Snowden.”89 The report continues, “We must ensure the
big data analytics powering continuous evaluation are used in ways that
protect the public as well as the civil liberties and privacy rights of those
who serve on their behalf.”90
This understated section in the report highlights that as data grows,
so should the Fourth Estate’s wariness over the safety of its sources and
journalists. This concern appears legitimate, arising in large part from the
growing number of leak prosecutions in recent years. In the 100 years since
the Espionage Act of 1917 passed, there have been a grand total of only
14 prosecutions targeting leakers. The majority of these prosecutions have
only come in the last decade during the boon of data: eight under Presi-
dent Obama’s administration, and one in the first six months of President
Trump’s administration. In fact, more leak prosecutions occurred under
the Obama Administration than under all other previous administrations
combined.
This is exceptionally troubling given that confidential sources confiding
in journalists is the foundation for some of the most democratically impor-
tant and honored news reporting in our country. Canonically, more than
42 Data Journalism and the Law
150 articles authored by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein were based
on unnamed sources. More recently, based on reporting from confidential
sources, The New York Times was able to reveal that the National Secu-
rity Agency had been monitoring phone calls and email messages without
seeking approval from federal courts.91 Several other news organizations
reported on the use of harsh interrogation tactics against terrorism sus-
pects.”92 And since the beginning of the Trump administration, confidential
sources have been central to reporting on issues involving our democracy.
Even more troubling perhaps than these worries around sourcing is the
increasing discussion and legal theory developing for imprisoning not just
sources, but journalists. President Obama’s Department of Justice was
first to utilize the legal argument in a complaint asserting that a journal-
ist, James Rosen, was a co-conspirator to his source’s actions.93 While the
charges were later dropped, the legal theory seems to have been resurrected,
at least in conversation, within President Trump’s administration. Since
President Trump assumed office, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has stated
that criminal investigations into the sources and journalists are up 800 per-
cent.94 When asked if he would imprison a journalist, Sessions responded
he might if it “makes things easier.”95 In addition, the administration has
warned government employees that leaks will be penalized. While the ad-
ministration’s efforts to clamp down on leaks are not a deviation of prece-
dent, its strong insinuations that it will prosecute not only leakers, but
also news organizations and journalists, is an aberration from decades of
custom.96 Additionally, other actions like arrests, equipment seizures, im-
personation of journalists, subpoenas, and possible tracking of journalists
have also arisen as concerns.97
Leaks are integral to democracy, however, as they help keep the govern-
ment in check. As Daniel Ellsberg, the whistleblower in the Pentagon Pa-
pers case, recently put it: “Can you really have democracy, in a real sense,
with the government having the final voice and the total voice as to what
citizens shall know about what they’re doing, and whether they’re telling
the truth and whether they’re obeying the law? I would say no.”98 This
view has been echoed by famed legal scholars and First Amendment attor-
neys, such as Alexander Bickel who presaged that while the government
must “guard mightily” to protect its information, the press must oppose
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and contest this force and publish everything “newsworthy” to preserve the
equilibrium of information in our democracy. The following explores the
complex nexus between government, leakers, journalists, and the law in a
landscape where leakers have more data than ever before at their finger-
tips. It investigates new concerns around leaks, the current administration’s
approach to them compared to previous administrations, the laws in place
that can be used to penalize journalists and leakers, as well as how leakers
and journalists can protect themselves (and their sources) in a world where
big data leaks are becoming commonplace.
New risks with leaks
Whistleblowers have always played a central role in newsgathering. In
the famed 1971 Pentagon Papers case, the Nixon administration tried to
prevent The New York Times and The Washington Post from publishing
classified documents regarding the Vietnam War. In an affidavit submit-
ted for the case, which established the right of a news publication to print
classified documents leaked to a newspaper despite a prior restraint, New
York Times Washington Bureau Chief Max Frankel explained that leaks
are intrinsic to journalism and are the “currency” of American democ-
racy.xlvii Similarly, legal scholars like Alexander Bickel have by implication
underscored the important role leaks play to preserving the role of the press
protected under the First Amendment.99 Bickel argued that the Pentagon
Papers ruling vindicated the “disorderly situation” or the contest between
the government and the press for information and “the presumptive duty of
the press . . . to publish, not to guard security or to be concerned with the
morals of its sources.”100 Today, however, because of the abundance of data,
changes in the legal landscape, and the shifting attitude toward the press,
everyday circumstances cause confusion and hinder the reporter-source rela-
tionship.101 Before discussing the legal implications, it is important to note
several recent developments in leaking. The first is the size of leaks and
their technological implications; the second is the legal guidelines used by
the DOJ and the changes within them.
xlvii. Affidavit, United States v. New York Times Co. et al., U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Civil File 71-2662, RG 21
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1. The size of leaks
In 2010, WikiLeaks published 400,000 pages or 1.7 GB of classified ma-
terials, comprised of documents, videos, and diplomatic cables sent by
former soldier Chelsea Manning. Subsequently, the site began near con-
tinuously publishing leaked documents from various sources. Just three
years later, Edward Snowden leaked 1.7 million documents about the NSA’s
surveillance programs to The Guardian. While the industry could not have
imagined a more copious leak, in 2016 several news organizations published
stories on the Panama Papers, the largest leak in history consisting of 11.5
million documents and a staggering 2.6 terrabytes of data.
The size of these leaks has various practical and legal implications. Un-
like the 7,000-page Pentagon Papers leaked in 1971, these “big data” leaks
can no longer be manually perused—or, for that matter, manually handed
over to newsrooms in cardboard boxes. Instead, the documents are often
transmitted electronically to newsrooms through special security tools,
and then searched with dedicated tools to determine if any of it is in the
public interest and worth publishing. In addition to the mere difficulty of
transferring large files of data, there are also various legal surveillance and
technological tactics in place that allow the intelligence community and law
enforcement to access electronic communication records and ascertain what
information has been shared with journalists. For that problem, tools like
SecureDrop, an open-source whistleblower submission system used by media
institutions, have been employed to securely transfer documents without
revealing a source’s identity.
However, SecureDrop is not a panacea. For instance, digital commu-
nications leave footprints, allowing the the source, recipient, or both, to
be identified, making it easier for authorities to initiate prosecution pro-
ceedings. The most recent example of this arose with Reality Winner, who
leaked documents to The Intercept last year.102 In this case, The Intercept
published the documents—which were watermarked and traceable—online,
leaving Winner easily susceptible to prosecution. Some newsrooms have
avoided this problem by creating new documents altogether before publish-
ing so that any watermarks or signage is completely removed. Additionally,
newsrooms have always employed traditional tactics like redactions, verifi-
cation, and anonymous sourcing.
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Alongside the concern over revealing sources, the size of these leaks
makes it harder to ensure proper redaction of libelous or private informa-
tion that a newsroom can be held liable for publishing. As a basic tenet of
defamation law, anything a newsroom publishes—even if it is contained in
documents—can trigger liability. While redactions work, they require much
more tenacity than ever before. For instance, while a judge recently ruled
that BuzzFeed may have protection for publishing the Trump dossier, the
lawsuit shows how the lack of a redaction may lead to possible liability and
expensive litigation costs.
Due to the difficulty in maneuvering large leaks, there have even been
cases where though news organizations have opted not to publish the leaked
data in raw form, stories about its existence—which wouldn’t result in legal
liability (because the information wasn’t published)—still had potential to
cause harm to individuals. For instance, when Luke Harding and David
Leigh published their book, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Se-
crecy, they disclosed the passphrase that Assange had used to encrypt the
leaked embassy cables, assuming it was no longer in use and that the files
were not available publicly. Unbeknownst to the journalists, even though
WikiLeaks had removed the files from its servers, they ended up on Bit-
Torrent and were accessible to the public. Not only did these files include
details like the queen of the Netherlands’ personal phone number, they also
contained the names and contact information of informants in Israel, Jor-
dan, Iran, and Afghanistan, some of whom had to be relocated as a result
of this breach.
Cases like this one demonstrate how even if journalists follow protocol
and are not hasty about publishing content without thinking through the
consequences, human folly can catch up with them and put others—and
their newsrooms—at risk.
2. Possible changes to the DOJ guidelines
In the event of leaked information being published by a news outlet, the
government is bound to immediately take action to find the source and stop
the transmission of information. In order to identify the whistleblower, the
government can initiate various processes, including bringing in the FBI
and CIA. Other questionable tactics have also been employed. For instance,
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past administrations have surreptitiously wiretapped journalists to identify
their potential sources. President Kennedy initiated Project Mockingbird,
which allowed the government to eavesdrop on the communications of jour-
nalists who covered leaks; President Nixon had people surveilling journal-
ists; and during President Obama’s administration, the phone records of
journalists were seized. These schemas offend our notions of First Amend-
ment press protections. Thus, to protect against investigative tactics that
would obstruct the First Amendment, the Justice Department has created
various rules—the most well-known are commonly referred to as the Media
Guidelines—to be followed.
For over 40 years, outlined in its own policy, the Department of Jus-
tice has implemented a series of procedures for its law enforcement when
investigating members of the press with respect to the First Amendment
rights of the news media.xlviii The Guidelines were created in 1972 during
the Nixon presidency to protect against the chilling effect that investiga-
tive tools have on the “reporter-source relationships and therefore on the
flow of information to the press.”103 xlix Overall, the Guidelines announce
three procedures federal officers must meet before they can, as a “last re-
sort” after “all reasonable alternative attempts” have been taken, subpoena
information about the press.l First, the Guidelines require advance autho-
rization by the attorney general before issuance. Second, they recommend
the agency provide “reasonable and timely notice” to the affected news me-
dia member of the request before issuance. Third, they provide that notice
opens the door to possible judicial review.
In August, Attorney General Jeff Sessions said a new task force had
been established inside the FBI to focus on leaks to the press and public.
During this announcement, the attorney general also said he was reviewing
the Media Guidelines that had been overhauled by the previous attorney
general, Eric Holder, in 2014. The amendments made to the Guidelines
in 2014 were done so after convening over 30 news organizations, as well
as First Amendment groups and academics, to obtain insight from these
xlviii. 28 C.F.R. §50.10 (hereafter “Section 50.10 Guidelines” or “Guidelines”)
xlix. David McCraw, National Security Letters and Leak Investigations, Just Security
Jan. 20, 2016.
l. S 50.10 (a)(3) (describing subpoenas as a “last resort” and “all reasonable alterna-
tive attempts” must first be taken)
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stakeholders when revising its policies. Reviewing and possibly changing
these Guidelines to make it easier for the FBI to subpoena news media
records is seriously concerning, especially given that the current rules are
an expression of built consensus from various stakeholders. Moreover, these
rules already have loopholes that create potential for obfuscating the spirit
of the Guidelines in a data-driven landscape.
Since they were created, the Guidelines have been strengthened several
times in response to various instances where the government improperly
investigated the press. In 1980, they were fortified to protect journalists’
telephone toll records held by third-party telephone companies after it was
disclosed that the FBI obtained toll records of The New York Times’s At-
lanta bureau and home telephone records of the bureau chief by subpoena.
The FBI had also directed the telephone company not to notify the paper
for a month and a half, thereby stymieing any possible challenge to the
subpoenas.li
Most recently, in 2014 the guidelines were expanded to include addi-
tional procedures after public outcry about government investigations into
Fox and AP reporters. But these changes appear to have left holes: Today,
newsrooms use online applications and social media platforms rather than
notebooks and pens that are kept in their offices, and the government can
more easily subpoena digital materials from third parties than work prod-
ucts from a newsroom.104 Similar to the events of 1980, in May 2013 the
Associated Press reported that the government had surreptitiously seized
two months of telephone records for at least 20 AP phone lines, includ-
ing home and cellphone records used by journalists to communicate with
sources.105 106 The events were a “massive and unprecedented intrusion”
into newsgathering activities of the press, according to the AP.107 Within
the same week, Fox News correspondent James Rosen was identified in a
search warrant as a “co-conspirator” to a leak, enabling the FBI to obtain
li. Policy with Regard to Issuance of Subpoenas to Members of News Media, Subpoe-
nas for Telephone Toll Records of Members of News Media, and Interrogation, Indict-
ment, or Arrest of, Members of News Media, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,436 (Nov. 19, 1980) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. §50.10)
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the journalist’s personal emails in connection with the investigation.lii Fox
News was “outraged” and called the incident “downright chilling.”108
The events alarmed the news media, members of Congress, and the
country. Fifty media organizations wrote a letter to Attorney General Eric
Holder saying, “The nation’s news media were stunned” by the event be-
cause “none of us can remember an instance where such an overreaching
dragnet for newsgathering materials was deployed by the Department, par-
ticularly without notice to the affected reporters or an opportunity to seek
judicial review.”liii Members of Congress similarly voiced concern about the
government’s breaches.liv Even the president showed concern and directed
Attorney General Eric Holder to “review existing Department of Justice
guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters.”109
Upon President Obama’s instructions, a group of media organizations
was convened by the Department of Justice to help revise and strengthen
the Guidelines. A coalition of over 50 news media organizations led by the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press submitted comments.110
Subsequently, Attorney General Holder “personally held seven meetings
with approximately 30 news media organizations as well as with First
Amendment groups, media industry associations and academic experts”
and the Justice Department issued a public report outlining its revisions.111
Among its revisions, the Justice Department underscored that the Guide-
lines would require additional authorized review, advanced notice, and judi-
cial oversight. For one, they required approval from the attorney general for
tools, such as court orders issued under the Stored Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. §2703(d), used to obtain records related to the news media.lv
Notice to, and negotiations with, members of the news media whose records
are sought, either directly or from third parties, was also highlighted.112
lii. Letter from Gary Pruitt, Exec. President & CEO, Associated Press, to Attorney
General Eric Holder, Dep’t of Justice (May 13, 2013)
liii. Letter from Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 50 other news orga-
nizations, to Attorney General Eric Holder, Dep’t of Justice (May 14, 2013), available at
http://rcfp.org/x?xszk.
liv. Letter from Chairman Bob Goodlatte, House Judiciary Comm., and Chairman
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations
Subcomm., to Attorney General Eric Holder, Dept of Justice (May 29, 2013)
lv. See Office of Attorney General, Memorandum to All Departments January 14, 2015;
see also §§50.10(a)(3), (c)(1), (c)(4)(i), and (c)(5)(i).
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In February 2014, the new Guidelines were formalized. After convening a
group one last time to review the amended Guidelines, they were revised
again in January 2015 to clarify ambiguous language involving internal
training requirements and updates to internal manuals for field officers.113
Despite this concerted effort, the Guidelines were not comprehensive and
lacking in a way that is worrisome given our new data landscape.114 The
Guidelines remained silent as to NSLs, thereby possibly allowing the FBI to
circumvent the Guidelines’ requirements of authorized approval, notice, and
judicial oversight for the news media—for instance, an agency may go to
third parties to obtain journalists’ records. Lack of authorization with NSLs
is especially concerning because the government has previously reported the
FBI abused use of similar tools, such as exigent letters, against the press.115
In fact, Barton Gellman, The Washington Post reporter who covered the
Snowden leaks, has been told that his phone records have been obtained
via an NSL, meaning he spends a lot more of his time on “technical and op-
erational security,” providing potential sources with various options across
different domains, along with relevant instructions: email, chat applications,
or SecureDrop.116 Moreover, it has been reported that an average of nearly
60 NSLs are being issued daily.117
Even more significant is that using NSLs the FBI may fail to provide
the news media with proper notice, as required by the Guidelines, in analo-
gous circumstances. Today, as journalists often use a variety of tools, apps,
and calendars on their phones and computers, the agency can go to online
providers like Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc. (where reporters
speak to their sources, keep their calendars, and source contacts) instead
of to a news organization to obtain a journalist’s information. Since many
newsrooms today use Gmail for their email clients, it is more likely that
NSLs will be issued on various internet companies like Google to obtain
journalistic information; NSLs already have nondisclosure requirements or
gag orders imposed on the third parties, making it easy to muzzle those
parties and obviate the spirit of the Guidelines.lvi Indeed, in 2016 The In-
tercept published leaked secret portions of the Domestic Investigations and
Operations Guide, which indicate that FBI agents have been allowed to
obtain journalists’ phone records with the approval of only two internal of-
lvi. See 18 U.S.C. §2709(d).
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ficials.118 It is worth noting that The Intercept also raised the question of
whether other procedures may exist that circuvment the Guidelines, such as
procedures involving the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.119
Unfortunately, this seems likely. Attorney General Sessions recently
stated that the Department of Justice has 27 leak investigations open,
which is nine times as many investigations as last year. In November 2017,
Marty Baron, the executive editor of The Washington Post, said, “It’s pos-
sible that some Post reporters are ensnared in leak investigations right
now, but The Post wouldn’t know it unless there was a subpoena, a search
warrant or ‘an actual leak about the leak investigation.’ ”120 Similarly, two
media organizations have resorted to suing the Trump administration to
find out what surveillance procedures have been adopted to target journal-
ists. The Knight Institute and Freedom of the Press Foundation recently
filed a FOIA lawsuit to have the agency disclose any revisions to the FBI
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (known informally as the
DIOG) that concern the use of secret “national security letters” and any
other secret tools.
The Espionage Act: Penalties for
the journalist and the source
Leaked information can frustrate and embarrass an administration, but
that does not make leaks de facto illegal. There is currently no clear, black-
and-white course of action available to the government—that is to say, no
single statute that the government uses to prosecute. Instead, as a 2017
congressional research survey points out, “The legal framework is based
on a complex and often overlapping set of statutes with provisions that
differ depending on, among other factors, what information was disclosed,
to whom it was given, and the intentions of the discloser.”121 Generally,
under this framework, the leaker is more liable than the journalist or the
news organization. Referring to this as the “source-distributor divide”
in an article for The Harvard Law Review titled “The Leaky Leviathan,”
Columbia Law School professor David Pozen says, “The First Amendment
has been construed to provide so little protection for the leaker and yet so
much protection for the journalist who knowingly publishes the fruits of the
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leaker’s illicit conduct and thereby enables the very harm—revelation of
sensitive information to the public and to foreign adversaries—that the leak
laws were designed to combat.”122
The traditional reporter-source divide: Pentagon
Papers and Bartnicki
From a legal perspective, historically it has been generally assumed that a
reporter would be protected by the First Amendment in a circumstance of
leaking. Two landmark decisions reached by the Supreme Court, New York
Times Co. v. United States and Bartnicki v. Vopper, seemed to provide
copious protection.123 124 Indeed, in a congressional hearing University of
Chicago law professor Geoffrey Stone told congressmembers that prose-
cuting journalists would outright violate the First Amendment. However,
the notion that reporters are protected from prosecution has increasingly
become open to debate.125
Perhaps the most important case establishing protection for journalists
and their publishers comes from the 1971 decision New York Times Co.
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court permitted The Times to
print the Pentagon Papers—then-classified documents about the Vietnam
War that the Nixon administration wanted to keep secret. The decision
cemented the rule that prior restraints on publishing could only withstand
the strictest standard if the government can show that the publication
would cause “grave and irreparable” danger.126 The watershed case made
clear that only in dire circumstances where a clear injury would result could
a publication be thwarted from sharing the news—even when obtained from
a source. That said, several justices wrote separately suggesting that the
Department of Justice could still prosecute the journalists after the story
was published.
However, those stray remarks seemed to get clarified in perhaps the sec-
ond most important case on leaking: the 2001 Supreme Court decision in
Bartnicki v. Vopper. In this case, a radio commentator at a local station,
Vopper, played a clandestinely taped conversation between a union nego-
tiator and union president involving a teachers’ strike in a Pennsylvania
high school. While the recording was determined to be illegally intercepted,
the Supreme Court ruled that “the statutes do not forbid the receipt of the
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tape itself.”127 A concurring opinion clarified that even though the person
who taped it had committed a crime, because Vopper had “engaged in no
unlawful activity other than the ultimate publication of the information
another had previously obtained,” had “neither encouraged nor participated
directly or indirectly in the interception,” and because publication was in
the public interest, no liability could ensue.128
These precedents have led most media lawyers to understand that the
press is rather free to publish information, even if obtained illegally, so
long as the journalist does not originally participate in acquiring the infor-
mation, and its publication is in the public interest and would not cause
irreparable harm. While the Bartnicki precedent has not yet been tested on
any case involving national security or the Espionage Act, it is often paired
in the minds of media attorneys with the Pentagon Papers to solidify the
right to publish even the most sensitive government information—such as
the recent Snowden leaks.
Even so, in the recent past there have been occasions when these protec-
tions have come into question, and the government has considered bringing
forward charges against the distributors—news organizations or individual
journalists—as well. For example, as previously mentioned, in May 2013
Fox News Washington correspondent James Rosen was named “at the very
least, either as an aider, abettor and/or co-conspirator” in an espionage
case involving a State Department security adviser. Additionally, both the
previous administration and the current one have contemplated bringing es-
pionage charges against WikiLeaks, which would set a dangerous precedent
for other news media organizations.
What follows explores the legal options available to prosecute both the
leaker and the journalist or news organization for different types of leaks.
While possible statutes include the the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act (1982), the Atomic Energy Act (1954), and various federal statutes
codified under US Code (U.S.C.), the focus is on the Espionage Act (1917),
the most likely option to be used.
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Open questions under the
Espionage Act
When America entered World War I, the Espionage Act was passed to
thwart espionage activities, including collection and communication of
sensitive national defense information that would benefit American ene-
mies. Passed in 1917, the law’s one-hundredth anniversary came in 2017.
A century later, the Espionage Act seems to have turned into a broad anti-
disclosure law akin to the UK’s Official Secrets Act, which is used by the
government to prevent any and all leaks pertaining to national defense.
More specifically, it is irrelevant whether the leak is in public interest.
To date, 14 leakers have been prosecuted for violating the Espionage Act
in the last 100 years, nine of whom have been charged in the last decade.
Even in cases where the administration acknowledges that the unauthorized
disclosure was in the public interest and had minimal real-world impact,
the government remains adamant that the leaker must be penalized.
Thus far, though, no journalists or news organizations have been prose-
cuted, despite there being “nothing in the language of the law that prevents
its use against a news organization.”129 However, as already mentioned,
the government is getting more aggressive in dealing with leaks pertain-
ing to national security, be it via labeling journalists as co-conspirators or
attacking the integrity of news media itself.
Whether the Bartnicki v. Vopper ruling provides journalists absolute
protection under the Espionage Act is unknown, but it should not be taken
for granted for multiple reasons. First, prosecutions under the Espionage
Act are for leaks involving classified government information, whereas Bart-
nicki involved private information. Second, the act is incredibly broad
in language, making both the receipt of sensitive information and the re-
tention of that information unlawful, not just its publishing. Lastly, the
Espionage Act deals with national security, which is a continually growing
category wherein the state secrets privilege grows in expanse every day. As
detailed in the “Developments in International Media Law” bulletin pub-
lished by the Media Law Resource Center in October 2017, the authors
warn that concerns about the Espionage Act prosecuting journalists is not
merely hypothetical.130
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There are two main sections of this Act under which news organizations,
journalists, and leakers can be indicted: Sections 793 and 798, which pose
even more concern in our data-heavy environment.
Section 798 of the Espionage Act explicitly bars publishing, unlike any
of the subsections of §793. The text reads: “Whoever knowingly and will-
fully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an
unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the
safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign gov-
ernment to the detriment of the United States any classified information.”
Classified information here includes code, cipher, cryptographic systems,
and communication intelligence activities, all pertaining to national secu-
rity. Only one national security leaker has been charged for violating §798:
Shamai Leibowitz. There is also a still-pending criminal complaint which
charges Snowden with violating §798.131
Unlike 798, Section 793 of the Espionage Act is even more draconian
because it “prohibits certain activities related to gathering, receiving, or
transmitting national defense” even if the journalist does not publish the
information as long as one is “not entitled to receive it.” The section has
eight subsections, six of which are relevant to leaks to news media, and
three of which have been used to charge unauthorized disclosures. Section
793(a) prohibits obtaining information connected with national defense in-
frastructure that is owned by the United States, which is then “to be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign na-
tion,” and §793(b) clamps down on obtaining or duplicating “any sketch,
photograph, photographic negative. . . document, writing, or note of any-
thing connected with the national defense.” Perhaps even more stringent
is §793(c) which implicates anyone or any organization that receives or at-
tempts to receive any material related to national defense, provided the
recipient knows that the material was sourced by violating other provisions
of the Espionage Act. Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers fame is the only
leaker charged with violating §793(c).lvii According to this language it ap-
lvii. §793(d) incriminates anyone with security clearance who “willfully communicates,
delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts
to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted
the same to any person not entitled to receive it” material pertaining to national secu-
rity. Daniel Ellsberg, Samuel Morison, Lawrence Franklin, Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Jeffrey
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pears unclear whether simply obtaining documents through SecureDrop
could be construed a violation.
However, §793(e) is considered by some to be the section that poses
the greatest and broadest risk to journalists, as it targets those who have
“unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over” material related to
national defense, and who subsequently “wilfully communicates, delivers,
transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or at-
tempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted” among those not entitled to receive it. There is
little in the language of this section to limit application of the section to
journalists who did not themselves take documents from the government.
Thus, this makes Bartnicki’s possible defense application even more inappli-
cable.
Historically, the courts seemed to side with news organizations responsi-
ble for publishing the sensitive material, lessening concerns around §793(e).
In New York Times Co. v. United States, Justice Douglas said that the
word “communicates” in §793(e) does not encompass publishing by news
media; if it did, the subsection would explicitly say so, as “Congress was ca-
pable of, and did, distinguish between publishing and communication in the
various sections of the Espionage Act.”132 Moreover, some precedent sug-
gests that “reason to believe [the leaked documents] could be used to the
injury of the United States”lviii is a stringent requirement. In United States
v. Rosen, many feared that the case, involving two lobbyists, could become
a precedent for the prosecution of journalists under the Act. The govern-
ment eventually decided to abandon its case after a federal judge held that
the prosecution would have to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
lobbyists acted with a certain “mens rea” or “bad purpose” to disobey or
disregard the law, and that disclosure of the documents could harm the
United States.lix The district court for the Eastern District of Virginia in-
Sterling, and John Kiriakou have all been charged with violating this subsection of the
Espionage Act. Further, there’s a pending criminal charge against Snowden for violating
this subsection. §793(f) focuses on gross negligence, where the person who has lawful
access to the national security material “permits the same to be removed from its proper
place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen,
abstracted, or destroyed,” and fails to disclose it having knowledge of the breach.
lviii. 18 U.S. Code 793
lix. United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006)
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sisted that §793(e) “’requires the government to demonstrate the likelihood
of the defendant’s bad faith purpose to either harm the United States or to
aid a foreign government.”’ Thus, while Daniel Ellsberg, Samuel Morison,
Lawrence Franklin, Thomas Drake, Chelsea Manning, Jeffrey Sterling, and
James Hitselberger have all been charged with violating §793(e), no news
organizations associated with those leaks have been prosecuted.
In addition to the high mens rea requirement for §793, there is a thought
that the law is too unclear for the government to bring charges. “The Es-
pionage Act is so vague and poorly defined in its terms, that it’s hard to
say exactly what it does and does not cover,” said Steven Aftergood, direc-
tor of the Project on Government Secrecy for the Federation of American
Scientists.133 This ambiguity in the law would make any prosecution under
the Act stand on very shaky ground. An unsuccessful prosecution against
a journalist would likely threaten its efficacy at deterring leakers. While
Justice Harlan called the Act “singularly opaque” and other academics have
called it “incomprehensible,” the likelihood that a claim would have been
brought against a news organization was very limited—that is, at least,
until the most recent presidential election.134
Recently, the consideration of charges brought against a news organi-
zation is not unthinkable. While the Justice Department under President
Barack Obama actively decided not to charge WikiLeaks for revealing gov-
ernment information because it was too similar to a news organization,135
the current Justice Department has indicated to prosecutors that it is re-
considering the case. The Washington Post reported last year that the
administration was drafting a memo considering the possibility of a pros-
ecution.136 While scholars like Professor Stone believe that prosecuting
journalists would violate the First Amendment, there is no way of knowing
what is in store for the future.
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During the composition of this report, threats toward the press have con-
tinued. In June 2018, Reality Winner pleaded guilty under the Espionage
Act after being the first person prosecuted by the Trump administration on
charges of leaking classified information. The same month, New York Times
reporter Ali Watkins became the focus of a lurid investigation by her own
paper into her relationship with Senate staffer James A. Wolfe, who was
arrested on charges not of distributing classified information, but of lying to
investigators. Watkins’s telephone and email records were seized as part of
the investigation, and Customs and Border Patrol Officer Jeffrey Rambo,
who gained illicit access to documents pertaining to the investigation, ac-
costed Watkins and tried to coerce her into informing him of the details
of her colleagues work, including their sources. More recently, President
Trump has repeatedly stated that a large percentage of the media is the
“enemy of the people.” These concerns are not limited to public officials.
Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, made disparaging comments about reporters at
The Center for Investigative Reporting after the newsroom published a se-
ries of stories about his company, and said he would create a new site called
“Pravda” where journalists could be rated according to truthfulness.
In many cases, President Trump’s penchant for flamboyant rhetoric
about the mainstream media has been cited as either tacitly approved-of
or emboldening the public against the press, including Jarrod Ramos, who
killed five people when he attacked the newsroom of The Capital Gazette in
Annapolis, Maryland, with a shotgun.
Trump’s tweets and speeches regularly deride established news organiza-
tions like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and especially CNN
as “fake news.” His language around leaks, which he has called the work of
“traitors,” is particularly troubling.137
This stance toward leaks has been a feature of Trump’s administration
since his first days in office. Soon after the inauguration, then-Press Secre-
tary Sean Spicer made White House aides leave their mobile phones on a
table to undergo a “phone check” in an attempt to ensure that the staffers
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were not speaking to reporters. CNN reported that Spicer had the sign-off
from the president before initiating these checks.
President Trump’s contempt for the essentials of free expression came to
further light in May 2017 after FBI Director James Comey leaked memos
describing his encounters with the president to the press through Columbia
Law Professor Daniel Richman. The memos revealed that during a Febru-
ary 2017 conversation, the president told the ex-FBI director to consider
putting reporters in prison for publishing classified information and sug-
gested approvingly that they might be raped there.
In May 2017, when The Washington Post reported on the president’s
son-in-law and senior advisor, Jared Kushner, President Trump sent three
tweets that read:
It is my opinion that many of the leaks coming out of the White House are
fabricated lies made up by the #FakeNews media.
Whenever you see the words ‘sources say’ in the fake news media, and they
don’t mention names . . .
. . . it is very possible that those sources don’t exist but are made up by
fake news writers. #FakeNews is the enemy!
Two months later, in response to a story about Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, President Trump tweeted, “These illegal leaks, like Comey’s, must
stop!” Finally, in January 2018, a White House memo by Chief of Staff
John Kelly banned the use of personal electronic devices, including mo-
bile phones and smart watches, by White House staff to “to protect White
House information technology infrastructure from compromise and sensi-
tive or classified information from unauthorized access or dissemination.”
According to one unnamed senior White House official, the new policy is
“designed to prevent leaks and ensure the productivity of the people who
work here.”138
Within 10 days of the president suggesting that his attorney general was
weak on leaks, Sessions announced there were currently “three times as
many leak investigations as were open at the end of the Obama era” in a




In April 2017, The Washington Post reported that federal prosecutors
are contemplating bringing criminal charges against WikiLeaks for the 2010
leaks to the organization by Chelsea Manning, and that arresting Assange
was a priority.140 That same month, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo called
WikiLeaks “a non-state hostile intelligence service”;141 by August of last
year, the Senate had tried to insert the exact same language about the
anti-secrecy organization into a boilerplate appropriations bill.
Continuously lambasting the press and its sources inflicts damage in at
least two ways: First, imposing restrictions and inculcating fear among
government workers, including with a lockdown of devices used inside
the White House, can stymie speech, especially as the growing number
of communications enabled by technology are increasingly kept secret by
easy deletion, end-to-end encrypted messaging, and new policies requiring
stricter secrecy.
Second, framing leaks as traitorous and journalists as the “enemy” has
serious consequences for our democratic order. As RonNell Anderson Jones
and Lisa Sun wrote in a recent article about the subject, “Undercutting
the watchdog, educator, and proxy functions of the press through enemy
construction leaves the administration more capable of delegitimizing
other institutions and constructing other enemies—including the judi-
ciary, the intelligence community, immigrants, and members of certain
races or religions—because the viability and traction of counter-narrative is
so greatly diminished.”142
Lastly, as data becomes ever more difficult to collect, review, and dis-
tribute, framing the press as the enemy undermines even the tenuous grip
the public can be expected to have in the current, confusing environment.
Labeling news “fake” in this oversaturated and cacophonous atmosphere
undercuts the ability of the press to investigate, clarify, and report in ways
that add to our understanding of truth.
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